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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
system is strikingly illustrated in the principal case. According to the
complaint, there are at present thirty-five miles of power lines in
Johnston County belonging to plaintiff which run parallel to lines de-
fendant proposed to construct. That this would cause a great waste,
for which the public ultimately would have to pay, is obvious.
The muddled situation has been somewhat remedied in North Car-
olina by a resolution of the state Authority (passed after the Johnston
County project had been approved) requiring co-operatives to obtain
certificates from the utilities commissioner before the Authority will
approve as feasible the proposed projects. However, in view of the
possibility that the federal Rural Electrification Administration might
exert its influence to persuade the state Authority to repeal this reso-
lution, it would be wise for our legislature to strike out the "complete
in itself" clause and add a provision requiring the co-operatives to ob-
tain certificates of convenience and necessity from the utilities com-
missioner. A state's electrical policy can be administered more effi-
ciently if control is centered in one 'body. There is no good reason
why the co-operatives should protest against such regulation. If there
is a real need for the proposed power line, the utilities commissioner
will grant the certificate. Nor should the privately owned utilities fear
regulated co-operatives, whose aim it is to construct only in rural areas
which are inadequately supplied with electricity at present and into
which the existing utilities do not wish to extend.2 0
CHAS. AYCOCK POE.
Torts-Last Clear Chance Doctrine.
The plaintiff's intestate, while sitting on a cross tie in a stooped posi-
tion with his elbows on his knees and his head between his hands, was
killed by the defendant's train. Deceased was shown to have been in
full possession of his faculties a short time 'before the accident. The vic-
tim made no attempt to get off the track, and the engineer, who was
violating a city speed ordinance, made no effort to stop until it was too
fication Administration, none by the state Authority. The -personal opinion of the
chairman of the state Authority was that only 100 miles of the proposed 390 mile
project were feasible; nevertheless the whole project was approved by the fed-
eral body. Impartial testimony tended to show that estimates, on which federal
approval was based, of the number of farmers -who would wire their homes and
of the number of ranges, refrigerators, etc., they would purchase, were consider-
ably exaggerated.
One of the important achievements of the Rural Electrification Authority has
been the spurring on of private utilities. E.g., the Carolina Power & Light Co.,
since the 1935 statutes were adopted, has constructed or has under construction
or has approved for immediate construction, 1,190 miles of rural lines. As a re-
sult of the co-operation of municipalities and private companies with the Authority,
there have been projected more miles of rural lines in North Carolina than in
any other statd. See affidavit of Dudley Bagley, chairman of the North Carolina
Authority, appearing in the record of the principal case, p. 49.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
late to avoid the accident, although the deceased was seen for a distance
of several hundred yards. In an action for wrongful death judgment
was given for the plaintiff, but the supreme court reversed the decision,
stating that the last clear chance doctrine did not apply and that the
action should have been dismissed on the defendant's motion for judg-
ment as of nonsuit. 1-
The doctrine of the last clear chance has long been recognized in
North Carolina,2 and has been applied especially to cases involving rail-
roads. The North Carolina court has uniformly held that a duty
rests on the engineer of a train to keep a vigilant lookout for persons or
animals on the track,3 and that he is presumed to have seen them at the
earliest moment they could have been discovered by a proper perform-
ance of his duty. As a result of this rule the last clear chance doctrine
may be applied not only in cases where a person in peril is in fact per-
ceived on the track, but also in cases where, though in fact not seen, he
would have been perceived had the engineer kept a proper lookout.4
The fact that the engineer sees a person upon the track does not
necessarily mean that he must stop or even slacken his speed. When the
victim is seen walking or standing upon the track, apparently in full
possession of his faculties, the cases are uniform in denying recovery
for his injury or death since the engineer, until the last moment, has a
right to rely upon his getting off the track. Such an action is usually
dismissed upon the defendant's motion for nonsuit.5
'Lemings v. Southern Ry., 211 N. C. 499, 191 S. E. 39 (1937).
'Note (1926) 5 N. C. L. REv. 58. According to this note the last clear chance
doctrine was first applied in North Carolina in the case of Gunter v. Wicker, 85
N. C. 310 (1880).
'Carter v. Southern Ry., 135 N. C. 498, 47 S. E. 614 (1904); Ray v. Aberdeen
& Rockfish R. R., 141 N. C. 84, 53 S. E. 622 (1906) ; Caudle v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry., 202 N. C. 404, 163 S. E. 122 (1932) ; Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.,
205 N. C. 127, 170 S. E. 120 (1933).
'Deans v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 107 N. C. 686, 692, 12 S. E. 77, 79 (1890).
In -this case the court said, "If the engineer discover, or by reasonable watch-
fulness may discover, a person lying upon the track asleep or drunk, or see a
human being who is known by him to be insane or otherwise insensible to danger,
or unable to avoid it, upon the track in his front, it is his duty to resolve all
doubts in favor of the preservation of life, and immediately use every available
means, short of imperiling the liyes of passengers on his train, to stop it."; Pickett
v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 117 N. C. 616, 23 S. E. 264 (1895); Lassiter v.
Raleigh & G. R. R., 133 N. C. 244, 45 S. E. 570 (1903) ; Edge v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry., 153 N. C. 212, 69 S. E. 74 (1910).
. High v. Carolina Cent R. R., 112 N. C. 385, 17 S. E. 79 (1892) ; Abernathy
v. Southern Ry., 164 N. C. 91, 80 S. E. 421 (1913); Davis v. Piedmont & N. Ry.,
187 N. C. 147, 120 S. E. 827 (1924); Redmond v. Norfolk-Southern R. R., 196
N. C. 768, 147 S. E. 287 (1929); Thompson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 199
N. C. 409, 154 S. E. 630 (1930); Dix v. High Point T. & D. R. R., 199 N. C.
651, 155 S. E. 448 (1930) ; Rives v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 203 N. C. -227, 165
S. E. 709 (1932) ; Way v. High Point T. & D. R. R., 207 N. C. 799, 178 S. E. 571
(1935) ; Rimmer v. Southern Ry., 208 N. C. 198, 179 S. E. 753 (1935) ; Kuyken-
dali v. Southern Ry., 208 N. C. 840, 181 S. E. 625 (1935) ; Stover v. Southern Ry.,
208 N. C. 495, 181 S. E. 336 (1935).
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In the cases where a person is lying upon the track, the court says
that his prostrate appearance should suggest to the engineer that he is
helpless, and recovery is allowed by applying the last clear chance doc-
trine.6  The doctrine has also been applied where one is found dead
upon the track with no evidence other than a showing of sickness or
intoxication a short while before the injury,7 but where there is no
evidence of sickness, intoxication, or helplessness, the court has dis-
missed the action as of nonsuit.8 If one is upon the track in full pos-
session of his faculties, but with no means of escape, 9 as when one is
upon a trestle; or if he is apparently absorbed in some other activity,10
then the doctrine is applied and recovery allowed.
There have been a number of cases in which the victim was sitting
upon a cross tie in a stooped position because of sickness or intoxication,
and the court has allowed a recovery by applying the last clear chance
doctrine.1 1  In all these cases the court stated that the apparent con-
"Deans v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 107 N. C. 686, 12 S. E. 77 (1890) ; Pickett
v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 117 N. C. 616, 23 S. E. 264 (1895); Arrowood v.
South Carolina & G. Extension Ry., 126 N. C. 629, 36 S. E. 151 (1900) ; Carter
v. Southern Ry., 135 N. C. 498, 47 S. E. 614 (1904); Sawyer v. Roanoke R. R.
& Lumber Co., 145 N. C. 24, 58 S. E. 598 (1907); Holman v. Norfolk & W. R. R.,
159 N. C. 44, 74 S. E. 577 (1912); McManus v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 174 N. C.
735, 737, 94 S. E. 455, 456 (1917). In this case the court said, "We consider it
not amiss to note that it is not always required for the application of this doctrine
that the person injured or killed should have been unconscious, but the same may
at times be presented when a claimant was in a' position of such peril that it is
evident that ordinary effort on his part will not avail to extricate him."
'Powell v. Southern Ry., 125 N. C. 370, 34 S. E. 530 (1899).
'Holder v. North Carolina R. R., 160 N. C. 3, 75 S. E. 1094 (1912) ; Henry
v. Norfolk S. R. R., 203 N. C. 277, 165 S. E. 698 (1932); Allman v. Southern
Ry., 203 N. C. 660, 166 S. E. 891 (1932); Hester v. North Carolina R. R., 209
N. C. 843, 183 S. E. 377 (1936).9 McLamb v. Wilmington & W. R. t, 122 N. C. 862, 29 S. E. 894 (1898);
McCall v. Southern Ry., 129 N. C. 298, 40 S. E. 67 (1901); Snipes v. Manufac-
turing Co., 152 N. C. 42, 46, 67 S. E. 27, 29 (1909). In this opinion the court
said, "Ordinarily, cases calling for application of the doctrine indicated arise when
the injured person was down on the track, apparently unconscious or helpless, ...
but such extreme conditions are not at all essential, and the ruling should prevail
whenever an engineer operating a railroad train does or, in proper performance
of his duty, should observe that a collision is not improbable, and that a person
is in such a position of peril that ordinary effort on his part will not likely avail
to save him from injury; and the authorities are also to the effect that an engineer
in such circumstances should resolve doubts in favor of the safer course." Hop-
kins v. Southern Ry., 170 N. C. 485, 87 S. E. 320 (1915).
"Lassiter v. Raleigh & G. R. R., 133 N. C. 244, 45 S. E. 570 (1903) ; Caudle
v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 202 N. C. 404, 163 S. E. 122 (1932) ; Triplitt v. Southern
Ry., 205 N. C. 113, 170 S. E. 146 (1933).
" Marks v. Atlantic Coast Line t R., 133 N. C. 89, 45 S. E. 468 (1903); Guilford
v. Norfolk & S. Ry., 154 N. C. 607, 70 S. E. 393 (1911) ; Tyson v. East Carolina
R. R., 167 N. C. 215, 217, 83 S. E. 318, 319 (1914). This case quoted with
approval the following passage, "A man seated on a cross tie of a railroad track,
apparently asleep or unconscious, presents an unusual, not to say an extraordinary,
spectacle, and we think it was the province of the jury to determine whether or
not an engineer of ordinary prudence, seeing a man so situated, ought not com-
mence checking the train in time to prevent injuring him, if it should transpire
that he was unconscious or asleep." (italics ours); Jenkins v. Southern Ry., 196
N. C. 466, 146 S. E. 83 (1929).
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dition of the victim should have put the engineer upon notice that the
deceased was not sensitive of his peril.
The holding in the principal case should be contrasted with that in
Smith v. Salisbury and Spencer Railway Co. 1 2 where the deceased was
sitting upon the tracks with his elbows upon his knees and his head
between his hands when struck. There was no evidence of sickness or
intoxication. The court ruled that the case should go to the jury to
determine if the motorman could have avoided the accident by exercis-
ing due care even though the plaintiff was negligent.
In the principal case the deceased was in the same position as in the
Smith case. The victim was not sick or intoxicated in either case and
in both was perceived by the engineer; yet the principal case held that
a nonsuit should have been granted; the Smith case, that it was proper
for the case to go to the jury.
In a majority of the North Carolina cases where the victim is actually
perceived on the tracks, it seems that the court views the facts not from
the standpoint of the engineer in the cabin of his locomotive, but bases
the decision on whether or not the deceased was actually ill or intox-
icated at the time of the accident. Since these facts are not revealed until
after the accident these decisions defeat the purpose of the last clear
chance doctrine except in cases where the deceased was actually ill or
helpless. In spite of their holdings the court emphasizes the apparent
condition of the injured party. If this apparent condition of the victim
is to be the test rather than his actual condition, the court should have
affirmed an application of the list clear chance doctrine in the principal
case. CLARENcE W. GRIFFIN.
Witnesses-Privileged Communications between Physician and
Patient-Waiver Clauses in Insurance Applications.
Plaintiff, as beneficiary, sued defendant insurer on a life insurance
policy issued to her deceased husband. The application for the policy
contained a clause1 waiving the statutory privilege against disclosure
of communications between physician and patient.2 In view of the
- 162 N. C. 30, 36, 77 S. E. 966, 968 (1913). In this opinion the court said,
"If a person be seen upon the track who is apparently capable of taking care of
'himself, the motorman may assume that he will leave the track before the car
overtakes him, but he cannot act upon that presumption with respect to a person
who is apparently insensible of his danger from sleepiness, drunkenness, or any
other like cause." (italics ours).
1, . . And further waive for myself and beneficiaries the privileges and
benefits of any and all laws which are now in force or may hereafter be enacted
in regard to disqualifying any physician or nurse from testifying concerning any
information obtained by him or her in a professional capacity; and I expressly
authorize such physician or nurse to make such disclosures."2 N. C CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1798.
